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In the quantum version of a Trojan-horse attack, photons are injected into the optical modules of
a quantum key distribution system in an attempt to read information direct from the encoding
devices. To stop the Trojan photons, the use of passive optical components has been suggested.
However, to date, there is no quantitative bound that specifies such components in relation to the
security of the system. Here, we turn the Trojan-horse attack into an information leakage problem.
This allows us quantify the system security and relate it to the specification of the optical elements.
The analysis is supported by the experimental characterization, within the operation regime, of
reflectivity and transmission of the optical components most relevant to security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since ancient times, the Trojan-horse has been known as
a stratagem for penetrating a securely protected space.
It is therefore essential to consider Trojan-horse attacks
in determining the boundaries of any supposedly secure
space. This explains their ubiquitous presence in differ-
ent fields where privacy is required, ranging from cryp-
tography to computing and finance. In particular for a
cryptographic application like quantum key distribution
(QKD) [1–4], as well as for its most recent developments
showing full or partial independency from the specific de-
vices used [5–10], the existence of a protected area is a
fundamental assumption.
QKD allows two remote parties, usually called Alice
(transmitter) and Bob (receiver), to share a common se-
cret key with information theoretical security, over an in-
secure quantum channel and an authenticated or broad-
cast classical channel. QKD’s security derives from the
laws of quantum physics and its implementation neces-
sarily makes use of physical systems, whose correct be-
havior has to be characterized and guaranteed against
unwanted imperfections. Any ignored deviation from the
expected behavior can be exploited by an attacker (Eve)
to compromise the system security. In Fig. 1, the Trojan-
horse attack (THA) against an optical QKD setup is
sketched. Eve uses the optical channel connecting Alice
and Bob to launch a bright light pulse containing Trojan
photons into Alice’s supposedly secure module. The light
pulse reaches the encoding device and is encoded with the
same information ϕ as the photon normally prepared by
Alice and then sent to Bob. The information ϕ is meant
to be private. However, some of the Trojan photons are
reflected back and deliver it to Eve, thus compromising
the security of the system.
This eavesdropping strategy was initially described
in [11] and afterwards named “Trojan-horse attack”
in [12]. Due to its apparent simplicity, the THA has
been often considered easily tractable. However, to date,
there is no quantitative analysis to mitigate it and there is
an increasing number of experiments showing its severity
FIG. 1. Representation of the Trojan-horse attack against an
optical QKD setup. Eve sends a large amount of Trojan pho-
tons (thick arrow) against Alice’s defensive structure. Some of
the photons reach the encoding device, are encoded with the
private information ϕ and reflected back to Eve (thin arrow),
who retrieves the information by measuring the photons.
instead [12–16]. For example, it was shown in [12] that
phase information can be extracted from a LiNbO3-based
encoding device using optical-frequency-domain reflec-
tometry. More recently, it has been demonstrated that
phase values from an encoding device can be discrim-
inated with 90% success probability using only 3 pho-
tons [13].
To counteract the THA, different solutions have been
proposed. On the one hand, active countermeasures, sim-
ilar to the ones used to ensure the security of the ‘plug-
and-play’ QKD setup [17–20]. Alice could be endowed
with an active phase randomizer [12, 21] and a watchdog
detector [17, 18] to remove the phase reference from Eve’s
hands and bound the energy of the incoming light pulses.
However, active components usually add extra complex-
ity to the setup and may offer more options to the eaves-
dropper [14]. For instance, it has been shown recently
that a monitoring detector of a commercial QKD system
can be bypassed easily [15]. On the other hand, pas-
sive countermeasures can be realized with much simpler
elements, e.g. optical fiber loops, filters and isolators,
which leave fewer degrees of freedom to the eavesdrop-
per. Furthermore, they are often inexpensive, simple to
implement and to characterize experimentally. However,
in this case, powerful resources like the phase randomiza-
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2tion and the watchdog detector cannot be used to prove
the security of the system.
As a result, the security analysis of the THA remains
elusive and no security-proof solution has been derived
to date. The only provably secure countermeasures are
for users endowed with a teleportation filter [22] or for
the receiver in a system running the BB84 protocol [1,
11]. In the former case, the solution is not practical and
it entails considerable changes in the setup that could
open additional loopholes. In the latter case, a delay
line installed at the entrance of Bob’s module prevents
Eve from reading the basis information before the qubit
has entered Bob’s protected territory. However, the same
measure is ineffective to protect the transmitting side of
the QKD system, nor does it apply to other protocols
such as the B92 [23] and the SARG04 [24]. Hence it
cannot be considered a general solution against the THA.
In this work, we analyze an entirely passive architec-
ture to counteract the THA. We provide quantitative
bounds that connect the values of the passive optical
components to the security of the QKD system. The key
element is interpreting the THA as a side channel. Nor-
mally Alice is unaware of it and treats her preparation as
ideal. This causes undetected leakage of information from
her module to Eve’s territory. However, if Alice charac-
terizes the relevant optical components in her apparatus,
she can bound the information leakage and attain secu-
rity through an adequate level of privacy amplification.
II. THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION
Let us consider the transmitter module [25] in the unidi-
rectional, fiber-based, phase-modulated QKD setup de-
picted in Fig. 2. In the THA, Eve injects light into Alice’s
apparatus through the same optical fiber that serves as
a quantum channel between the users (thick arrow in the
figure). The goal is to reach the phase modulator that en-
codes the private information ϕA. A concrete possibility
for Eve is to use a laser emitting pulses with average pho-
ton number µin, prepared in a coherent state |√µin〉 [26].
The pulses acquire the phase modulation information ϕA
and return to Eve as |eiϕA√µout〉 (thin arrow in Fig. 2),
where µout = γµin, being γ  1 the optical isolation of
the transmitting unit. The light pulse retrieved by Eve
is correlated to the phase ϕA and this compromises the
security of the system.
To prevent the THA, Eve’s action has to be bounded
by a physical mechanism. In particular, it is clear that
if the intensity µin is unbounded, no solution can exist
against the THA. On the contrary, when µin is bounded,
Alice can adjust the value of the optical isolation γ so to
make µout, and therefore Eve’s information, arbitrarily
small. In this work, we consider the Laser Induced Dam-
age Threshold (LIDT) as the main physical mechanism
limiting Eve’s action. The LIDT provides an estimate of
the energy, thence of the number of photons, that Eve
can inject into Alice’s module in a characteristic time in-
FIG. 2. Schematics of the transmitting unit of a unidirectional
fiber-based QKD setup and Eve’s THA. LS is a generic light
source. The square with ϕA is the encoding device. It writes
the phase information ϕA on photons traveling in the short
arm of the interferometer. Eve injects a bright light pulse in
the coherent state |√µin〉 into Alice’s module. A fraction of
it is encoded by Alice and back-reflected to Eve, emerging as
|eiϕA√µout〉, i.e., attenuated by a factor γ (µout = γµin) but
containing the phase information ϕA (dashed line).
terval without damaging it. Details about the LIDT are
given in Section III. For the moment we call N the max-
imum number of photons that Eve is allowed to inject
in the transmitter module in the time unit (1 second)
without violating the LIDT condition. This parameter
will be used to provide a security argument against the
THA.
A. Preliminary quantities
In a THA, Eve firstly prepares M groups of photons and
then use each group to probe a different value of Alice’s
phase modulator (PM). To fix ideas, we can imagine that
each group of photons physically corresponds to one pulse
of Eve’s light source and that each pulse is prepared in
a pure coherent state [27]. The resulting structure is a
tensor product of coherent states:
|√µ1〉 ⊗ |√µ2〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |√µM 〉. (1)
In Eq. (1), µi (i = 1, ...,M) is the mean photon number
of the i-th coherent state. In order to not overcome the
LIDT threshold N , Eve has to guarantee the following
condition:
M∑
i=1
µi = Mµin < N, (2)
where we have introduced the overall mean photon num-
ber of Eve’s light µin. In general, it is possible for Eve to
vary each µi to enhance her strategy. However, it turns
out that this brings no advantage to her, as we shall show
later on. The convexity of the key rate as a function of
µi makes it always better for Eve to set µi equal to a
constant value. Therefore we have:
µi = µin. (3)
3It can be noted that Eq. (3) rules out a whole class of
attacking strategies by Eve, where she redistributes her
initial Trojan photons in a fewer number of pulses. Intu-
itively, this could increase Eve’s information on a subset
of Alice’s states, but can never increase her total infor-
mation about the whole key. It is beneficial to Eve to
distribute her photons evenly among the available pulses,
so to maximise her total information. We will reach the
same conclusion in Sec. III.A, but from a physical point
of view. There, an even distribution of the Trojan pho-
tons will allow Eve to keep the LIDT of an optical com-
ponent close to its minimum value.
Each of Eve’s Trojan pulses is sent in the transmitting
unit to probe a different phase value ϕA of Alice’s PM.
After that, the pulses are retrieved by Eve and their mean
photon number amounts to µout = γµin. Let us call fA
the total number of phase values encoded by Alice’s PM
in 1 second. This is equal to the PM clock rate, expressed
in Hz. Because Alice knows fA, the maximum number
of Trojan photons per second N and the optical isolation
γ, she can bound the mean photon number of the Trojan
pulses emerging from her module. We call µout the upper
bound. It amounts to:
µout =
Nγ
fA
. (4)
µout is a crucial parameter in the security argument be-
cause it is directly controllable by Alice. It can be inter-
preted as the mean photon number of the Trojan pulses
retrieved by Eve.
In the next section, we proceed from these preliminary
observations to derive the secure key rate of the BB84
protocol, assuming that Alice is endowed with an ideal
single-photon source. Then, in Section II.C, we extend
the security argument to the BB84 protocol implemented
with a laser source and decoy states.
B. Key rate of single-photon BB84 protocol
Let us suppose that Alice prepares ideal single-photon
BB84 states and that the only source of information leak-
age from Alice’s system to Eve is from the THA on the
PM. Eve shall execute the THA using coherent states of
constant intensity as per Eqs. (1) and (3). We assume
the worst-case scenario where Eve can retrieve her states
back from the quantum channel with 100% fidelity, even
though, in practice, this may be not fully permitted by
the laws of physics. In this description, the THA can
be executed without adding any noise to the communi-
cation channel. Despite this, secure keys can still be ex-
tracted if the QKD system is well characterized. This is
quite counter-intuitive as it challenges the common view
of QKD as an eavesdropping detection system, while pro-
moting it as an eavesdropping prevention system [28].
The characterization of the QKD system proceeds as
follows. With reference to Alice’s interferometer (see
Fig. 2), we define the states in the computational ba-
sis Z as |0Z〉 = |1〉l|0〉s, |1Z〉 = |0〉l|1〉s, where |n〉l (|n〉s)
is the n−photon state traveling in the long (short) arm
of the interferometer. Then we write the four BB84 pro-
tocol states as |0X〉, |1X〉 and |0Y 〉, |1Y 〉 for the X and
Y bases, respectively, corresponding to setting the phase
ϕA equal to {0, pi} and {pi/2, 3pi/2}, respectively, in the
qubit state (|0Z〉+ eiϕA |1Z〉)/
√
2.
Eve’s task is to determine ϕA using the light back-
reflected from Alice’s apparatus. However, the states
prepared by Alice and sent to Bob (below labeled with
“B”) are single photons and do not give any phase refer-
ence to Eve. Also, the states sent and retrieved by Eve
(below labeled with “E”) originate from an external inde-
pendent source. Therefore the resulting states emerging
from Alice’s module can be written as tensor products:
|ψ0X〉BE = |0X〉B ⊗ |+√µout〉E ,
|ψ1X〉BE = |1X〉B ⊗ | −√µout〉E ,
|ψ0Y 〉BE = |1Y 〉B ⊗ |+ i√µout〉E ,
|ψ1Y 〉BE = |0Y 〉B ⊗ | − i√µout〉E . (5)
The above states justify an alternative interpretation of
µout, i.e., an excess mean photon number exiting Alice’s
module. If µout = 0, only true single-photon states leave
the transmitting unit, whereas if µout > 0, a hidden side-
channel, created by the THA, provides Eve with addi-
tional information via the excess photons contained in
the states of Eq. (5).
It is natural to ask how Eve can use the information
obtained in the THA. One possibility is for her to wait
until the basis reconciliation step of QKD, in order to
measure the back-reflected Trojan photons in the correct
basis and learn the bit encoded by Alice. In this case, Eve
simply prepares and retrieves the Trojan photons and
causes no disturbance on the quantum channel. How-
ever, she only gains the information carried by the Tro-
jan photons and makes no use of the photons prepared by
Alice. A more powerful strategy is to use the Trojan pho-
tons during the quantum transmission, without waiting
for the basis reconciliation step. Eve could first mea-
sure the Trojan photons and then decide whether to stop
or transmit Alice’s qubits conditional on the result from
her measurement. Finally, Eve could glean information
about the basis chosen by Alice and use it to measure Al-
ice’s qubits, thus making optimal use of all the sources of
information available to her. This is a convenient frame-
work, as it allows to prove the security of QKD against
the most general attack by Eve [29–31]. We analyze all
the above attacking strategies, from the weakest one to
the most general. The first and second THA are ana-
lyzed in Appendices C.1 and C.2, respectively, while the
third, most general, THA is outlined here and detailed
in Appendix B.
To bound the security in the general case, we resort
to the so-called “GLLP approach” [29]. More precisely,
we use the refinement of GLLP based on the qubit dis-
tillation protocol by Koashi [30]. In Appendix B, we
4apply this approach to the states in Eq. (5) and derive
the secure key rate of the efficient BB84 protocol [32, 33].
There, it is shown that if the key is distilled from the X
basis and the phase error rate is estimated in the Y basis,
the asymptotic key rate of a QKD system endowed with
a single-photon source is:
R = QX [1− h(e′Y )− fECh(eX)]. (6)
In Eq. (6), QX is the single-photon detection rate in the
X basis, i.e., the joint probability that a single-photon
pulse is emitted by Alice and detected by Bob and both
users measure in the X basis; h is the binary entropy
function, fEC is the error correction efficiency [34] and
eX is the (single-photon) quantum bit error rate (QBER)
measured in the X basis. The term e′Y is the (single-
photon) error rate estimated in a virtual protocol where
the users measure in the Y basis and Alice announces the
X basis [30]. It is given by the following equations:
e′Y = eY + 4∆
′(1−∆′)(1− 2eY ) +
+4(1− 2∆′)
√
∆′(1−∆′)eY (1− eY ) ,
∆′ =
∆
Y ,
∆ =
1
2
[1− exp(−µout) cos(µout)], (7)
where we conservatively defined Y := min[YX ,YY ], with
YX and YY the single-photon yields in the X and Y
basis, respectively, i.e., the conditional probabilities that
a single photon state emitted by Alice causes a click in
Bob’s detector, when the users measure in the same basis,
X or Y . The presence of µout in the last line of Eq. (7)
shows how the THA affects the key rate in Eq. (6).
The key rate R has been plotted in Fig. 3 as a function
of the distance between the users, for different values of
the output mean photon number µout, using parameters
close to existing real systems [35]. From the figure, it can
be seen that the key rate corresponding to µout = 10
−6 is
indistinguishable from µout = 0 (no THA) over distances
up to 100 km, i.e., about 60% of the maximum distance
(170 km in Fig. 3). For µout = 10
−8, the key rates in
presence and absence of a THA overlap over nearly the
whole range. In this case, a negligible amount of addi-
tional privacy amplification is required to guarantee secu-
rity against the THA. The key rate remains positive also
for µout = 10
−2, but the maximum distance is limited to
9 km in this case and the key rate is severely affected by
the THA. The largest value of µout showing a positive
key rate is 0.015.
It is worth remarking that the entire effect of the THA
is condensed in the parameter µout, as it is apparent from
Eq. (7). Therefore, the obtained key rate is equally ap-
plicable to any QKD setup capable of guaranteeing an
upper bound to the mean number of Trojan photons re-
flected by the transmitter back to Eve.
FIG. 3. Asymptotic key rate R versus distance for the single-
photon efficient BB84 protocol under a THA. The rate is plot-
ted for different values of the output mean photon number
µout. Other parameters in the simulation are: fiber loss co-
efficient 0.2 dB/km, total detection efficiency 12.5%, optical
error rate 1%, dark count probability per gate 10−5, error
correction inefficiency 20% above the Shannon limit.
C. Key rate of decoy-state BB84 protocol
The key rate in Eq. (6) has been derived assuming that a
single-photon source is available to Alice. However, it is
well-known that security can still be guaranteed without
a single-photon source if a phase-randomized attenuated
laser [36] is combined with the decoy-state technique [37,
38]. Actually such a solution is currently more efficient
than a single photon source due to the limited generation
rates of existing single photon sources [39, 40].
To extend the result to a decoy-state source, we as-
sume that the decoy-state execution is not affected by
the THA. This is equivalent to saying that Eve’s only
target in the THA considered here is Alice’s PM and the
devices used by Alice to implement the decoy-state tech-
nique are not touched by the THA (see Assumption 3 in
Appendix A and accompanying discussion). Under this
assumption, the decoy-state key rate is a straightforward
generalization of Eq. (21) along the lines described, e.g.,
in [38]. Indicating with a tilde the quantities to be esti-
mated via the decoy-state technique and with s the mean
photon number of the signal pulse in the decoy set of
states, we obtain:
R˜ = Q˜
(1)
X
{
1− h
[
e˜
′(1)
Y
]}
−Q(s)X fECh[e(s)X ], (8)
where:
e˜
′(1)
Y = e˜Y + 4∆˜
′(1− ∆˜′)(1− 2e˜Y ) +
+ 4(1− 2∆˜′)
√
∆˜′(1− ∆˜′)e˜Y (1− e˜Y ),
∆˜′ =
∆
Y˜ . (9)
In Eq. (8), Q˜
(1)
X is the decoy-state estimation of the single-
photon detection rate QX in Eq. (6), while Q
(s)
X is the de-
5FIG. 4. Asymptotic key rate R˜ versus distance for the decoy-
state efficient BB84 protocol under a THA, for various values
of the output mean photon number µout. Experimental pa-
rameters in the simulation are as in Figs. 3. The average
photon number of the signal states in the decoy-state tech-
nique is s = 0.5.
tection rate of the signal pulse measured in the X basis.
In Eq. (9), we conservatively defined Y˜ = min[Y˜X , Y˜Y ],
with Y˜X and Y˜Y the single-photon yields in the X and
Y basis, respectively, estimated via the decoy state tech-
nique.
The key rate R˜ is plotted in Fig. 4. Although rate
and maximum distance are smaller than in the single-
photon case (Fig. 3), as expected, it is remarkable that
the key rate corresponding to a value µout = 10
−7 re-
mains indistinguishable from the ideal rate (µout = 0)
over nearly the whole distance range. A 10 times larger
value, µout = 10
−6, which is easier to achieve in practice,
generates a key rate that closely follows the ideal one up
to 100 km, i.e., 70% of the maximum distance achievable
(146 km in Fig. 4), and remains positive up to 140 km,
i.e., 96% of the maximum distance. This motivates our
choice of µout = 10
−6 for the case study in Sec. IV.A. Fi-
nally, it is worth noting that the key rate remains positive
even for larger values of µout, up to 0.012.
Before concluding this section, a couple of remarks are
in order. First, it has been convincingly proven that the
key rate achieved with only three decoy states is very
close to that obtained with an infinite amount of decoy
states [41]. We have run simulations that confirm this
result. Therefore the key rate in Fig. 4 is achievable in
a real system. Second, the rate equations provided so
far have been derived using coherent states of constant
intensity. Here we show that this setting is actually ad-
vantageous to Eve. Suppose that Eq. (3) does not hold,
i.e., µi 6= µin. With this setting, Eve is trying to dis-
tribute her N Trojan photons unevenly among the M
pulses, in an attempt to enhance her information gain.
Suppose that Eve distributes the N photons in only two
classes of pulses, such that the first (second) class fea-
tures an average photon number µ1 (µ2) and µ1 < µ2 ,
µin = (µ1 + µ2)/2. Then, for each of the key rates given
in this work, represented by a generic symbol R, we have
numerically verified that:
R(µin) ≤ R(µ1) +R(µ2)
2
. (10)
For that, we have used the explicit expressions of the
key rates and their dependance on µout, which is re-
lated to the input photon number by the linear equa-
tion µout = γµin. In other terms, the key rates are con-
vex functions of µout and thence of µin. According to
Eq. (10), the rate distilled by the users under Eve’s new
strategy (R.H.S.) is larger than the one pertaining to the
old strategy (L.H.S.), so the new strategy is less effective
and not advantageous to Eve. More general strategies
by Eve that account for more than two classes of pho-
tons with different mean photon numbers can be treated
as a trivial extension of Eq. (10).
III. BOUNDS ON INPUT PHOTONS
In our security argument, the quantity N plays an im-
portant role. Here we provide more details about this
limiting threshold and describe a way to quantify it. For
that, we adopt a pragmatic approach, motivated by the
results of the previous sections. In particular, we have
established that Eve conducts the THA using coherent
states of constant intensity. Therefore we can conve-
niently think that such states are generated by a single-
mode laser operated well above threshold [42]. This view
naturally leads to considering the laser-induced damage
threshold, LIDT. From a security perspective, the LIDT
can only provide a general indication of the bounds to be
used in a security analysis. The actual response to ther-
mal damage of the real components of a QKD system
should be experimentally measured.
A. Laser-induced damage threshold
A single-mode optical fiber is arguably the most com-
mon component of a fiber-based QKD setup. It is used
mainly to transmit information in the third telecom win-
dow (wavelength λ = 1.55 µm) because of its small atten-
uation coefficient. Its typical core diameter is 8− 10 µm,
corresponding to a core area of 50− 80 µm2. If the laser
power used by Eve is sufficiently high, it creates an ac-
cumulation of energy in this small region of the core and
increases the temperature of the medium beyond the tol-
erance level, inducing fiber thermal damage [43, 44].
Such a damage threshold is usually quantified by the
LIDT, laser-induced damage threshold, defined in the
2011 international standard ISO 21254-1 as [45]: “the
highest quantity of laser radiation incident upon the op-
tical component for which the extrapolated probability of
damage is zero, where the quantity of laser radiation may
be expressed in energy density, power density or linear
6power density” [46]. The smaller the LIDT of the com-
ponent, the larger the probability to damage it. This
subject is well-studied and values for the LIDT of a silica-
based optical fiber, which is the component we are inter-
ested in, can be obtained. However, before discussing
the absolute values, it is worth examining the qualitative
behavior of the LIDT, which is determined by the un-
derlying thermal damaging mechanism. The purpose is
to investigate how features of Eve’s laser like the repeti-
tion rate or the pulse width can affect the LIDT and, by
consequence, the system security. This provides useful
indications for setting a proper LIDT value.
One prominent feature of the LIDT is that it increases
with the pulse width of the incident laser, i.e., a wide
light pulse causes less damage to the optical component
than a narrow one. This makes narrow pulses more de-
tectable to Alice and Bob than wide ones. This can be
formalized using the well-known square root dependence
of the LIDT on the pulse width [47–50]:
LIDT(τ1)
LIDT(τ2)
=
√
τ1
τ2
. (11)
Here τ1 and τ2 are two different pulse widths for the same
pulse energy. Eq. (11) suggests that Eve’s laser pulse
should be the widest possible, compatible with Alice’s
phase modulator.
A similar rule applies to the laser wavelength, resulting
in the shorter wavelength to be causing more damage to
the optical component than the longer one (see e.g. [51]):
LIDT(λ1)
LIDT(λ2)
=
√
λ1
λ2
. (12)
Eq. (12) suggests that Eve’s optimal laser’s wavelength
should be as large as possible, even larger, if necessary,
than the typical wavelength used in the QKD setup.
However, it also entails that the LIDT remains rea-
sonably constant for all the wavelengths possibly trans-
mitted in the fiber. A standard optical fiber cannot
transmit by total internal reflection beyond the so-called
“bend-edge” wavelength, which is only a few hundred of
nanometers away from the fiber cutoff wavelength (see,
e.g., [52]). As an example, we can consider a bend-edge
wavelength of 1850 nm for an optical fiber transmitting
at 1550 nm [53, 54]. According to Eq. (12), this would
increase the LIDT by less than 10%, showing that the
wavelength of Eve’s laser is not crucial in determining
the efficacy of the THA. To compensate for this effect in
the theory, it suffices to increase the LIDT value by 10%.
To upper bound the input photon number N used in
the security argument, we need to estimate the LIDT
of Alice’s optical module. This is arguably given by the
LIDT of the most fragile component in the module. How-
ever, we will consider the LIDT of just one of the com-
ponents in Alice’s unit, the one most exposed to Eve’s
light. The other components are assumed to either work
in their normal operation regime or fail in a way that is
detectable by the users (see Assumption 1 in Appendix A
and accompanying discussion). In Section IV, we de-
scribe the architecture of Alice’s setup against the THA.
The component most exposed to Eve’s light is a loop of
standard optical fiber placed at the main entrance of the
transmitting box. Hence we are interested in the LIDT
of a standard single mode optical fiber. One possible way
to estimate it, is to consider the geometry of the fiber and
the material it is made of. As said, a typical fiber has a
core area of about 50 µm2 and is made of fused silica. The
LIDT of fused silica is determined by the softening point
of the material [47] and amounts to 1.1×107 J/cm2 [55].
For a longer time, the silica-based medium starts dissi-
pating heat and the threshold increases linearly with the
pulse width. For a shorter time, the square root law in
Eq. (11) applies, decreasing the LIDT accordingly.
The above-cited LIDT value corresponds to an aver-
age power of 5.5 × 104 W over 50 µm2. For a typical
wavelength of λ = 1.55 µm this means that 4.3 × 1023
photons impinge every second onto the fiber core area.
Before such a large number of photons can damage the
fiber core, other highly detectable damages are likely to
occur at the fiber interfaces, causing, e.g., a net reduc-
tion of the transmission, or an increase in the noise figure.
Also, the LIDT value mentioned above relates to a homo-
geneous medium. In reality, large temperature gradients
can occur in the proximity of a defect, or at the connec-
tion between two segments of fiber, or at the interface
between the fiber core and the cladding. Some of these
properties can even be artificially enhanced by acting on
the number of connectors, the bending radius and the
doping levels of the fiber. These considerations lead to
the conclusion that the given LIDT value is an overly con-
servative estimation of the real LIDT of an optical fiber.
In the next section, we obtain a different LIDT value by
combining the findings of Section II with the results from
experiments performed on real optical fibers.
B. Fiber thermal fuse-induced LIDT
In Section II, we have shown from an information theory
point of view that Eve’s optimal strategy is to distribute
her photons into a number of pulses M that is equal to
Alice’s PM clock rate (in Hz) fA, so to maximize her
total information gain. In the description of Eve’s laser,
the above strategy translates into setting fE = fA, where
fE is Eve’s laser repetition rate. Moreover, in the previ-
ous section, we have shown that the LIDT depends only
weakly on the laser pulse width and that the larger the
width, the larger the damaging threshold. In the descrip-
tion of Eve’s laser, this translates into having a laser pulse
width, τE , as large as possible, compatibly with Alice’s
PM. Let us call τA the time window of Alice’s PM. If
τE > τA, a fraction of Eve’s photons falls outside the PM
gate and deliver no information to Eve. Therefore, the
optimality condition for Eve is τE = τA. This condition
on the pulse width represents an additional constraint for
Eve and an extra parameter under Alice’s control. After
7γ and fA, Alice can now act on τA to make Eve’s strategy
less effective. In particular, by reducing τA, Alice reduces
the damaging threshold of her module, thence N .
Let us draw a worst-case scenario from the above con-
siderations. We conservatively assume that Alice’s PM
is driven by a perfectly rectangle wave. This helps Eve
matching the condition τE = τA and simultaneously
keeping the damaging threshold high. As a consequence,
the amplitude of Alice’s PM is assumed to be flat in time.
The amplitude is selected at random among the four
equally spaced values of the BB84 protocol. The way
these values are selected depends on the logic driving the
PM. If a non-return-to-zero (NRZ) logic is used, the PM
duty cycle is 100%, i.e., the PM is always active, transit-
ing from a given phase value directly to the next one and
we have in this case τA = 1/fA. If a return-to-zero (RZ)
logic is used, the modulator is reset after each encoded
phase value. In this case the duty cycle is less than 100%
and the PM time duration is τA < 1/fA. We note that
in the particular case Alice’s PM is driven according to a
NRZ logic (100% duty cycle), Eve’s laser coincides with
a continuous-wave (CW) laser, as it emits a seamless se-
quence of rectangle pulses, all of the same amplitude,
sitting one next to each other. A deeper thought reveals
that this is actually a worst-case scenario, because when
the condition τE = τA is matched, τE takes on its max-
imum value (1/fA), thus minimizing the risk of optical
damage, while leaving Eve’s information unchanged. Be-
cause of that, we can always imagine that Alice’s PM is
driven by a NRZ logic, even if it is RZ and, accordingly,
that Eve uses a CW laser to probe the PM.
Experiments performed with CW lasers on real op-
tical fibers have demonstrated that an average power
around 2-5 W cause a catastrophic thermal damage in
a standard single-mode silica fiber [56–58]. This effect
is known as “self-propelled self-focusing” or “fiber ther-
mal fuse” [56, 57, 59–62, 64, 65]. The high power of
the laser generates a heating point in the fiber where
the local temperature overcomes the melting point of the
medium. From there, the damage propagates along the
fiber, eventually making it unusable. This effect has also
been exploited to build an “optical fuse” that breaks
by 1.2-5.3 W of incident light at wavelengths around
1500 nm [62]. For a wavelength of λ = 1550 nm, 2 W
correspond to 1.6 × 1019 photons crossing every second
a 50 µm2-fiber core area (a50). In order to have an easy
reference for the LIDT value, we set it equal to N = 1020
photons/s/a50. The new LIDT value is 4.3× 103 smaller
than the previous one. Still, it corresponds to 12.8 W
from a CW laser, which is much larger than the power
threshold reported in the fiber thermal fuse experiments.
We will adopt this number to draw an example where
the values of the optical components in Alice’s appara-
tus are connected to the security requirements. However
the more conservative threshold for N could be adopted
instead to arrange a different use case for an application
that requires a stronger bound, independent of the fabri-
cation details of the fiber and relying only the softening
FIG. 5. Architecture of a QKD transmitter to mitigate the
THA. OFL: optical fiber loop determining the LIDT; F : op-
tical filter; I: optical isolator; A: attenuator; R: total reflec-
tion from all components to the left of the dot-dashed line.
point of silica.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL CHARACTERIZATION
A. Passive architecture against the THA
An entirely passive architecture against the THA is
drawn schematically in Fig. 5. It is based on a sequence
of components that actualize the security argument de-
scribed so far. A silica-based optical fiber loop (OFL) of
length L defines the LIDT of the transmitter and is fol-
lowed by a filtering block F , an optical isolator I and an
attenuator A. We also indicate with R the total reflectiv-
ity of the optical elements to the left of the dot-dashed
line (not to be confused with the key rate R given in
Eq. (6) and plotted in Fig. 3). The line for the reflec-
tivity R is conservatively drawn to include also the first
beam splitter as seen by Eve to allow an easier experi-
mental implementation (Section IV.B). In the figure, all
the components are presumed to either work as expected
or fail in a way that is detectable by the users.
The OFL acts as a regulator for high-power input light
and as a filter for wavelengths longer than the bend-edge
point. Together with the optical filter F , which is tuned
to let pass the wavelength of the quantum channel and
stop all the others, it limits the maximum number N of
photons that Eve can inject into Alice’s module in the
chosen time unit. In other terms, it represents the opti-
cal component to which the LIDT should apply. To fix
the ideas, we can imagine a length for the OFL greater
than 1 m, in line with what was reported in the experi-
ments about the fiber thermal fuse effect. A longer OFL
can only be beneficial to the users, as it increases the
probability of thermal damage, which increases as well if
a few interfaces are present in the OFL.
The optical isolator strongly attenuates the input light
from Eve, enforcing the unidirectionality condition in the
module. A typical dual-stage optical isolator features an
isolation value of 10−5 or smaller. It is convenient to
measure the isolation in decibel, or dB, rather than in
absolute value. If x is the absolute value of the opti-
cal isolation of a given component, we use the following
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x˙ = 10 log10 x (13)
to indicate its value in decibel. So for example, the op-
tical isolator mentioned above would feature an isolation
of −50 dB.
The attenuator box in Fig. 5 is already present in the
schematics of various QKD systems using an attenuated
laser as light source, while it is not present in systems
using a single-photon source, as it would entail major
losses in the system. If used, it helps to avert the THA,
as it contributes to the optical isolation of Alice’s module,
γ. The following equation quantifies the contributions of
each single conceptual block in Fig. 5 to γ:
γ = F 2 × In ×A2 ×R. (14)
Eq. (14) can be conveniently rewritten in dB:
γ˙ = 2F˙ + nI˙ + 2A˙+ R˙. (15)
In Eqs. (14), (15), the typical double-pass of a THA
through Alice’s components has been considered. This
leads to explicit corrections for the filter and the at-
tenuator terms. For the isolator term there is no such
correction, because one direction of the double-pass fea-
tures zero attenuation. However, there is a factor n that
represents the number of optical isolators present in the
system.
To relate the isolation γ to the system security, we
need to connect it to the parameter µout via Eq. (4). For
that, we introduce the dimensionless ratio χ := N/fA
and rewrite Eq. (4) in dB notation:
µ˙out = χ˙+ γ˙ . (16)
To give an example of how Eqs. (15) and (16) can be
used to meet the security criterion, let us start from set-
ting a target value for the excess average photon num-
ber µout. We have seen from Figs. 3 and 4 that a value
µout = 10
−6 (i.e. µ˙out = −60 dB) can guarantee security
against the THA with only a negligible (limited) amount
of additional privacy amplification over short-range and
middle-range (long-range) QKD transmissions. There-
fore we choose this value as the target. We consider the
threshold valueN = 1020 photons/s/a50 discussed in Sec-
tion III.B and a system clock rate fA = 10
9 Hz. This
gives χ = 1011 (χ˙ = 110 dB). From Eq. (16), we then
get: γ˙ = µ˙out − χ˙ = (−60 − 110) dB = −170 dB. This
is the total optical isolation required in Alice’s module
in order to guarantee security. Alice can try and match
this value using well-characterized components and then
applying Eq. (15).
Table I contains some possible combinations of fA, R˙,
A˙ and I˙ to match the target value µ˙out = −60 dB. For
convenience, we report the absolute values of the compo-
nents. In the table, we set F˙ = 0, for the filter insertion
loss is typically close to zero at its central wavelength,
Clock rate fA (Hz) |γ˙| |R˙| |A˙| |I˙|(n)
1GHz 109 170 40 35 60(1)
1GHz* 109 170 50 0 60(2)
1MHz 106 200 40 30 50(2)
1MHz* 106 200 50 0 50(3)
1kHz 103 230 40 35 60(2)
1kHz* 103 230 50 0 60(3)
TABLE I. Practical combinations of system components to
meet the target µout = 10
−6 when N = 1020 photons/s/a50
and F˙ = 0 dB. All dotted quantities are in decibel and are
given in absolute value. Lines with the asterisk are cases in
which attenuation cannot be used, e.g., when the transmitter
uses a single-photon source or at the receiver side. The feasi-
bility of the values for 1 GHz clock rate has been confirmed
experimentally using the QKD setup described in [66] .
and we assume that the filter is centered at the opera-
tional wavelength of the QKD setup. In the first column,
we have considered three interesting and feasible regimes,
1 kHz, 1 MHz and 1 GHz. The lines with the asterisk are
for situations where attenuation cannot be used, e.g., if
the transmitter uses a single-photon source or at the re-
ceiver side. It is worth noting that single-photon sources
up to the MHz range are currently available (see, e.g.,
[39, 40]). In all cases, we have reported what we believe
the most practical combination of components could be.
For the optical reflectivity R˙, we have considered a typi-
cal absolute value of 40 dB, which comes from a common
fiber connector. However, an absolute value of 50 dB
is possible if angled connectors or splicing are used for
the fiber-integrated optics in the module. This latter op-
tion is worth considering especially for the lines with the
asterisk in Table I. For the optical isolator, its absolute
value is set in the factory and cannot be varied by the
users. We set it equal either to 50 dB or to 60 dB in Table
I, according to the most convenient configuration. The
former value is common in dual-stage optical isolators.
The latter value is less common, but it can be obtained
by properly sampling a set of isolators and selecting the
best one (see Sec. IV.B). Finally, for the attenuator, we
avoided using absolute values larger than 35 dB, as that
would commit the transmitter to unusually high-power
lasers.
From Table I, it can be seen that two or more optical
isolators might be necessary to meet the security target
µout = 10
−6. However, if the clock rate is high enough,
a single isolator is sufficient (first line of the table). In
any case, given the low cost and the low insertion loss
of filters, attenuators and optical isolators, all the op-
tions in Table I can be considered feasible and relatively
inexpensive.
9FIG. 6. Top - Schematics of the QKD transmitter module
and of the ν-OTDR setup used for characterizing its reflec-
tivity. Bottom - Reflection peaks of the transmitting unit.
The distance is measured from the connector J1 placed at the
entrance of the module. The traces are acquired for two or-
thogonal polarizations, aligned to maximize the transmission
through the short (blue traces) and long (red traces) arm of
the interferometer. The peaks of the reflectivity are added
to obtain a worst-case estimation (black). Only the peaks
from the components included in the shade region of the top
diagram have to be considered in the estimation of R.
B. Components characterization
To prove the attainability of the values reported in the
first line of Table I, we have experimentally characterized
reflectivity and transmission of the components most rel-
evant to security in the transmitting unit of a unidirec-
tional GHz-clocked QKD system [66], within their oper-
ational range. A full-range characterization of the real
components in the setup is necessary to guarantee their
behavior against unwanted deviations, as required by the
security argument (see Assumption 1 in Appendix A).
As a first step, we have used single-photon optical
time-domain reflectometry (ν-OTDR, [67]) to quantify
the reflectivity R of Alice’s apparatus. The measurement
setup and the resulting traces are shown in Fig. 6, on the
top and bottom diagrams, respectively. In the ν-OTDR
setup, a 1-MHz pulsed laser at 1550 nm is connected to
Alice via a circulator. Polarization controllers are used
to align the pulses to the long or short path of Alice’s
interferometer, so to obtain the output patterns of the
orthogonal polarizations. These are shown as blue and
red traces in Fig. 6. The two patterns have been added
together to upper bound the total reflectivity and this
is indicated by the black trace in the figure. The upper
bound to R is obtained assuming the linearity of the re-
flectivity, as follows: R(a|s〉+ b|l〉) = aR(|s〉) + bR(|l〉) ≤
FIG. 7. Spectral characterization of a dual-stage optical iso-
lator. The isolator shows less than 0.36 dB insertion loss
in the forward direction (right axis, empty squares) and more
than 65 dB isolation in the backward direction (left axis, filled
squares) around the central wavelength of 1550 nm.
R(|s〉) + R(|l〉), where the vector |s〉 (|l〉) represents the
polarization traveling in the short (long) arm and a, b
are complex numbers with modulo squared adding to 1.
The traces are plotted from the entering point of Alice’s
module, which is connector J1 in Fig. 6. However, only
the peaks pertaining to the components included in the
shaded region of the top diagram have to be considered
in the estimation of R (see also dot-dashed line in Fig. 5).
The sum of all the peaks relevant to R gives a total
reflectivity of −42.87 dB. This value meets the require-
ment R˙ < −40 dB set in the first line of Table I. Also, the
characterized QKD system includes an attenuator set to
−35 dB. To match the |γ˙| = 170 dB condition, additional
optical isolation of at least −60 dB is needed. Dual-stage
isolators specifying typical isolation at this level are com-
mercially available from a number of manufacturers. One
isolator was directly tested by us and featured an abso-
lute isolation larger than 65 dB in the proximity of the
main transmission wavelength of the system, 1550 nm, as
shown in Fig. 7. Across the S-, C- and L-Band, the iso-
lation value varies, until it reaches a minimum of about
40 dB. However, in this regime, the optical filter takes
over and provides high optical isolation so that a typi-
cal suppression of more than 80 dB is obtainable across
the entire C-band. Because the filter is crossed twice by
Eve’s light, this leads to more than 160 dB additional
optical isolation to the system whenever the wavelength
is different from 1550 nm. This demonstrates that the
values reported in the first line of Table I are feasible
when devices are operated in their working regime.
V. DISCUSSION
In the first part of the work, we derived our main result,
i.e., the secure key rate of a QKD system in the pres-
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ence of a THA, under reasonable assumptions (see Ap-
pendix A for a summary and a discussion of the assump-
tions). The result depends on Alice’s ability to limit the
number of the incoming photons N and to reliably upper
bound the mean number of Trojan photons µout exiting
from her module. However, the curves plotted in Figs. 3
and 4 are independent of N and can be applied to differ-
ent QKD systems, provided that the assumptions in the
theory are met. From the key rates, we have shown that
a value of the mean output photon number µout ∼ 10−6
allows to approach the situation with no THA for nearly
any distance between the users. For distances up to 70%
of the maximum working distance, this can be achieved
without any additional privacy amplification.
In Section III, we have drawn an example of how to
set a value on N using the thermal damage point of an
optical fiber. The most conservative value for N is in
the order of 1023 photons injected every second on the
core area of the fiber. This value has been obtained from
the softening point of a homogeneous medium made of
fused silica and is independent of future advancements in
technology, provided that the composition of fused silica
remains unchanged. A lower value for N , equal to 1020
photons/s/a50, has been drawn from recent experiments
on the thermal damage of real fibers, after taking into
account the presence of inhomogeneities in the fiber and
the qualitative behavior of the LIDT in response to the
laser pulse width. Using this lower value, we showed
the feasibility of our passive architecture in a practical
scenario. We related the key rate of a QKD system to its
clock, detection rate, reflectivity and to the properties
of a sequence of fiber loop, filter and optical isolator,
as depicted in Fig. 5. In Table I, we devised various
combinations of these components to meet the security
condition against the THA. According to the table, most
of the existing QKD systems can potentially be protected
from THA’s, provided that a sufficient number of optical
isolators are used and that the real components behave
as expected.
Some elements in our security argument may appear
optimistic, for instance, the use of coherent states by Eve.
However, we believe that our analysis is overall conser-
vative. The considered LIDT threshold corresponds to
a light power of 12.8 W from a CW laser and is larger
than the power required to activate the fiber thermal
fuse effect in a standard single-mode fiber. It is reason-
able to think that before this large number of photons
can melt the fiber core, some other mechanism would
make Eve detectable. We also assumed a noise-free re-
trieval of quantum states by Eve, while it is well known
that the retrieval is physically limited by Raman and
Rayleigh scattering. We decided not to consider the fact
that other QKD components, already present in Alice’s
module, could have a lower LIDT than the optical fiber.
Finally, we ignored that monitoring detectors are already
present in most of the QKD systems, mainly for stabiliza-
tion purposes. Such devices additionally constrain Eve’s
action and can be beneficial to improve our solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the security of a fiber-based
QKD setup endowed with passive optical components
against the long-standing Trojan-horse attack (THA). In
the framework of Ref. [29], we provided quantitative se-
curity bounds, easily applicable in practice, against a
general THA. With the proof method of Ref. [68], we
analyzed two specific examples of a THA, giving use-
ful insights into the THA mechanism and the method
employed to prove security against it (Appendix C). In
our analysis, we focused on a particular unidirectional
QKD setup, in which light flows from the transmitter
to the receiver and the reverse direction is forbidden.
This architecture is similar to that of the transmitters
used in Ref. [10] to guarantee the measurement-device-
independent security of the decoy-state BB84 protocol.
Hence we expect that our results can be applied to that
system after minor modifications. The unidirectional
configuration allows the use of optical isolators, whose
proper behavior has to be tested against undesired de-
viations. The resulting protection measure against the
THA is entirely passive, thus preventing the loopholes
inherent to active, more sophisticated, countermeasures.
We believe it will become a standard tool in all quantum-
secured optical systems that need to guarantee the pro-
tection of a private space.
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APPENDIX
A. Security-related assumptions
In the main text, we considered the unidirectional, fiber-
based, phase-modulated QKD setup depicted in Fig. 2
and studied its resistance to the THA. For that, we have
made a number of assumptions that we summarize in the
following list:
1. Alice has the ability to bound N , the number of
Trojan photons entering her setup. She can charac-
terize the components in her setup and test whether
they behave as expected under all relevant condi-
tions.
2. Eve uses a tensor product of coherent states to exe-
cute the THA. The intensity of the coherent states
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has not to be constant, but it is advantageous for
Eve to choose it so.
3. Alice’s light source emits either single-photon states
or phase-randomized coherent states that are per-
fectly encoded into the states of the BB84 protocol.
Imperfect encoding of the initial states as studied,
e.g., in Ref. [68] is excluded. The only side-channel
in the QKD setup is the THA against Alice’s phase
modulator described in the main body of this work.
4. The detection efficiency of the receiver is indepen-
dent of the basis choice and the basis is randomly
chosen by the users.
5. The key rate is worked out in the asymptotic sce-
nario, assuming that Alice and Bob have infinitely
many signals and decoy states to generate the key.
6. The reflectivity measured via the OTDR experi-
ment is a linear function of the input polarization.
Without Assumption 1, it would be impossible to prove
security. If the quantity N cannot be bounded, there is
no private space for the encoding of the classical informa-
tion onto the quantum systems, and the quantum protec-
tion is circumvented. In the main text, N was bounded
using the LIDT of the OFL in Fig. 5. It is natural to ask
whether a power monitor or a watchdog detector, placed
at the entrance of Alice’s unit to actively monitor the
input power, can provide an alternative, better, bound
to N . There are reasons suggesting against this option.
Firstly, an additional detector would add extra cost and
complexity to the setup, opening up additional potential
loopholes. For example, it has been shown in [15] that
a power monitor can be easily bypassed if not properly
engineered. Secondly, we used Eq. (11) for the LIDT,
according to which narrow pulses of light create a larger
damage to the optical component than continuous-wave
light, so they are more easily detectable by the users.
This let us draw a worst-case scenario for Eve’s laser. We
are not aware of a similar law applicable to a power mon-
itor. Finally, even if the power monitor solution worked
fine and allowed to reduce the input photon number N by
several orders of magnitude, it should still be compared
to the six or more orders of magnitude guaranteed by
the addition of a single inexpensive and nearly loss-free
component like an optical isolator.
As for the second part of Assumption 1, if Alice can-
not characterize her components, she cannot work out the
value of the optical isolation γ to relate N and µout via
Eq. (4). The characterization should consider the phys-
ical limits imposed to Eve’s laser. For example, Eve’s
laser’s power is constrained by the LIDT of the OFL in
Fig. 5. Therefore the behaviour of the components should
be tested up to the LIDT value of the OFL. This excludes
hacking strategies leveraging on an unexpected behavior
of the real components, passively or actively triggered
by the eavesdropper. The characterization step could be
simplified if an optical fuse with a LIDT value lower than
the lowest tolerance threshold of the components in Al-
ice’s setup were available [63].
Assumption 2 allows us to write the states leaving Al-
ice’s apparatus as in Eq. (5). It is possible, in princi-
ple, that phase-sensitive states of light, e.g. squeezed
states [42], could provide Eve with more information than
coherent states. However, as Table I shows, the value of
the attenuation in Alice’s setup is at least 170 dB. It
seems unlikely that the fragile squeezed state can survive
in this lossy environment. The second part of this as-
sumption descends from the convexity of the secure key
rate as a function of µout, which has been verified for all
the key rates presented in this work.
Assumption 3 is necessary to remove additional side-
channels that could, in principle, enhance the THA, e.g.,
encoding states that are different from the ideal ones pre-
scribed by the BB84 protocol. Also, it guarantees that
the rate equations derived for the decoy-state BB84 pro-
tocol hold, because Eve’s tampering with Alice’s decoy
state estimation would represent an additional side chan-
nel and would contradict the assumption. Extending the
security argument to decoy states without making use
of Assumption 3 could be a trivial task and a detailed
separate study is required. However, we would like to
speculate on this point further.
For simplicity, we assume that the light emitted by
Alice is phase-randomized. In some cases, this is sim-
ple to guarantee, e.g., when phase-randomization is an
intrinsic feature of the light source [36]. In other cases,
when phase randomization is committed to a separate
active component [21], it could be more difficult to show
that Eve cannot access this extra component with a more
refined THA. With phase randomization on hand, the
decoy state technique requires that the intensity of the
emitted light is varied in a random way, known to Alice.
This can be achieved by adding an intensity modulator
(IM) to the setup of Fig. 2, between the interferometer
and the laser source. If there is no additional optical iso-
lation between the IM and the interferometer, the optical
isolation γ that shields Alice’s PM from Eve applies to
the IM too and the coherent state sent by Eve to probe
the IM returns to her with an average photon number
not larger than µout. However, if there is a perfect opti-
cal isolator between the IM and the interferometer, then
the Trojan photons retrieved by Eve are only informative
about Alice’s PM, whereas the IM is perfectly shielded
from Eve. This latter case is an example of how the
Assumption 3 can be enforced. However, because a per-
fect isolation is impossible in practice, we considered how
the key rates of the decoy-state BB84 would change if a
single real optical isolator, guaranteeing 50 dB isolation,
were used instead. In this case, the µout back-reflected to
Eve from the IM would be 5 orders of magnitude smaller
than the one back-reflected from the PM. Applying to
this realistic scenario an argument similar to the one de-
scribed in the forthcoming Appendix C.2, we found key
rates that are indistinguishable from the ones presented
in this work.
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Assumption 4 and 5 are related to the proof meth-
ods adopted by us to draw the key rates in presence
of a THA [29–31, 68]. There, security was proven in
the asymptotic scenario leveraging on the fact that the
measurement performed by the receiver is equivalent
to a basis-independent filter followed by a two-valued
POVM (Positive-Operator Valued Measure). In [69] it
was shown that this assumption can be enforced if Bob’s
single-photon detectors have equal efficiency and if their
dark counts and efficiencies are carefully modeled. The
detectors can be threshold detectors and in this case a
specific value of the key bit must be assigned whenever
both detectors click, to guarantee the basis-independence
condition.
Assumption 6 is necessary during the characterization
stage to upper bound the reflectivity of the transmitter,
as shown in Sec. IV.A. To meet this assumption, we put
particular care in the OTDR experiment to avoid nonlin-
ear effects [70] due to a high power from the laser, which
is the only source of light in the experiment. For that,
the intensity of the laser was set to about 6 nW. Let us
notice that Eve is not playing any role here, because the
characterization of the QKD setup is accomplished in a
protected environment. Therefore, we can safely assume
that the reflectivity depends linearly on the polarization,
as in ordinary Fresnel equations.
B. Rate equations for the Trojan-horse attack:
general case
With the assumptions of the previous section on hand,
let us describe the security argument in more detail. In
the GLLP-Koashi approach [29, 30], an entanglement-
based description of the preparation stage is adopted.
The states to be prepared are given in Eq. (5). We rewrite
them here for convenience:
|ψ0X〉BE = |0X〉B ⊗ |+√µout〉E ,
|ψ1X〉BE = |1X〉B ⊗ | −√µout〉E ,
|ψ0Y 〉BE = |1Y 〉B ⊗ |+ i√µout〉E ,
|ψ1Y 〉BE = |0Y 〉B ⊗ | − i√µout〉E . (17)
The X basis states of Eq. (17) can be prepared by Alice
by measuring in the basis {|0X〉A, |1X〉A} the following
entangled state:
|ΨX〉 = |0X〉A|ψ0X〉BE + |1X〉A|ψ1X〉BE√
2
. (18)
Similarly, the Y basis states of Eq. (17) can be prepared
by measuring in the basis {|0Y 〉A, |1Y 〉A} the state:
|ΨY 〉 = |0Y 〉A|ψ0Y 〉BE + |1Y 〉A|ψ1Y 〉BE√
2
. (19)
If the state preparation stage was perfect, the two states
|ΨX〉 and |ΨY 〉 would be indistinguishable, as it can be
verified from the above equations in the limit µout → 0.
In this case, we know that the secure key rate of the
single-photon efficient BB84 protocol with data basis X
and test basis Y would be:
Rideal = QX [1− h(eY )− fECh(eX)], (20)
where QX is the single-photon detection rate in the X
basis; eY (eX) is the error rate measured from single
photons in the Y (X) basis; fEC ≥ 1 is the inefficiency
of error correction [71]. Because we are considering here
a single-photon source, all the quantities in Eq. (20) refer
to the single photon case.
When the preparation is not perfect, or part of the
basis information leaks out of the transmitting unit, the
states |ΨX〉 and |ΨY 〉 are different and the above key rate
has to be replaced by the following one [31]:
R = QX [1− h(e′Y )− fECh(eX)]. (21)
In Eq. (21), the phase error rate eY has been replaced by
a larger error rate, e′Y ≥ eY . It was shown in [30] that
the term e′Y is an upper bound to the error rate that the
users would find if they measured the X-basis state |ΨX〉
in the basis Y .
To find the relation between the error rates e′Y and eY ,
we can imagine that Alice owns a private bidimensional
quantum system, a “quantum coin” [29], and prepares
the following state:
|Φ〉 = |0Z〉C |ΨX〉+ |1Z〉C |ΨY 〉√
2
, (22)
where the subscript C refers to the quantum coin. The
states in Eqs. (17) can then be prepared by Alice by first
measuring the quantum coin in the basis {|0Z〉C , |1Z〉C}
and then, depending on the outcome, measuring the re-
sulting state |ΨX〉 or |ΨY 〉 in the basis {|0X〉A, |1X〉A} or
{|0Y 〉A, |1Y 〉A}, respectively. Because Eve has no access
to the quantum coin, she cannot distinguish this virtual
preparation from the real preparation executed in the
actual protocol. Therefore we are allowed to think that
Alice prepares her initial states using the quantum coin.
Also, she can delay her measurement until after Bob has
measured the states received from Alice. In this scenario,
by noting that Eve’s information about Alice’s key does
not change if Bob measures |ΨX〉 in the basis Y , Koashi
obtained e′Y from eY using a complementarity argument,
by applying the “Bloch sphere bound” [72] to the quan-
tum coin [30].
Let us quantify the basis dependence of Alice’s states in
terms of the quantum coin imbalance [29]. By rewriting
Eq. (22) in the X basis of the quantum coin, we find:
|Φ〉 = |0X〉C(|ΨX〉+ |ΨY 〉) + |1X〉C(|ΨX〉 − |ΨY 〉)
2
.
(23)
To quantify the basis dependence of Alice’s states, we
need to evaluate the probability that the two states |ΨX〉
and |ΨY 〉 are different. From the above equation, it
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amounts to the probability that Alice obtains the out-
come X = −1, associated to the state |1X〉C , when she
measures the quantum coin in the basis X. We call ∆
this probability:
∆ = Prob(XC = −1) = 1− Re(〈ΨX |ΨY 〉)
2
. (24)
Let us estimate it for the states prepared by Alice. From
Eqs. (18) and (19) we can calculate:
∆ =
1
2
[1− exp(−µout) cos(µout)]. (25)
When µout = 0, ∆ = 0 and the states emitted by Alice
are basis independent. However, when µout > 0, ∆ is pos-
itive and the states carry some basis information out of
Alice’s enclosure. The basis information can be exploited
by Eve to enhance her strategy, acting on the channel
losses, which are entirely under her control. Specifically,
she can replace the real channel with another, loss-free,
channel. Then she selectively stops all the states that
are not favorable to her, until the loss rate measured by
the users is matched. To account for this possibility, the
users must consider the worst case where all the non-
detected events were coming from X = 1 eigenstates of
the quantum coin and renormalize ∆ accordingly:
∆′ =
∆
Y . (26)
In Eq. (26), Y = min(YX ,YY ), with YX and YY the
single-photon yields measured in the X and Y basis, re-
spectively. Finally, using the Bloch sphere bound [72]
and the effective coin imbalance ∆′, the relation between
the phase error rates e′Y and eY is obtained as [30, 31]:
e′Y = eY + 4∆
′(1−∆′)(1− 2eY ) +
+ 4(1− 2∆′)
√
∆′(1−∆′)eY (1− eY ). (27)
When the single-photon source is replaced by a decoy-
state source and under Assumption 3 of Appendix A,
the resulting rate is a straightforward generalization of
Eq. (21) along the lines described in [38]. Indicating with
a tilde the quantities to be estimated via the decoy-state
technique, we have:
R˜ = Q˜
(1)
X
{
1− h
[
e˜
′(1)
Y
]}
−Q(s)X fECh[e(s)X ], (28)
where:
e˜
′(1)
Y = e˜Y + 4∆˜
′(1− ∆˜′)(1− 2e˜Y ) +
+ 4(1− 2∆˜′)
√
∆˜′(1− ∆˜′)e˜Y (1− e˜Y ),
∆˜′ =
∆
Y˜ . (29)
In Eq. (28), Q˜
(1)
X is the decoy-state estimation of the
single-photon detection rate QX (see Eq. (21)) and Q
(s)
X
is the detection rate of the signal pulse measured in
the X basis. In Eq. (29), we conservatively defined
Y˜ = min[Y˜X , Y˜Y ], with Y˜X and Y˜Y the single-photon
yields in the X and Y basis, respectively, estimated via
the decoy state technique.
C. Rate equations for two specific Trojan-horse
attacks
1. Trojan-horse attack with a passive use of the Trojan
photons
We analyze the security of the BB84 protocol against a
different, less general, THA. This serves a twofold pur-
pose: it provides un upper bound to the key rate achiev-
able in presence of a THA and gives us a chance to use
a different proof method to study the THA.
In the specific THA of this section, Eve uses the infor-
mation leaked from Alice in a passive way. She extracts
from the quantum channel the states labelled with E in
Eq. (17) and stores them in a perfect quantum mem-
ory. This causes no disturbance on the quantum channel
connecting Alice and Bob. Then, during the basis rec-
onciliation stage of the BB84 protocol, Eve learns the
basis information communicated by the users on a public
channel. This allows her to measure the stored states in
the same bases as the users and learn the resulting key
bit every time the result of her measurement is conclu-
sive. The conclusiveness of her results depends on the
magnitude of the parameter µout in the stored states.
We analyze this situation using the loss-tolerant proof
method described by Tamaki et al in [68]. For that,
we can use the equations of the previous section until
Eq. (21). The difference starts with the estimation of
the phase error rate in the virtual protocol, e′Y , which is
more direct than in the GLLP-Koashi approach.
We consider a real protocol, in which Alice prepares
the state in Eq. (17) and sends them to Bob (and Eve),
and a virtual protocol, in which an entanglement-based
view is adopted. In both cases, we assume that Bob’s
measurement does not depend on the basis choice. This
is guaranteed by the Assumption 4 discussed in Ap-
pendix A.
In the virtual protocol, Alice prepares the states to be
sent to Bob by measuring her half of an entangled state.
This is the same state as in Eq. (18), which we rewrite
here both in the X and in the Y basis:
|Ψ〉 = |0X〉A|ψ0X〉BE + |1X〉A|ψ1X〉BE√
2
, (30)
|Ψ〉 = |0Y 〉A|φ1Y 〉BE + |1Y 〉A|φ0Y 〉BE√
2
. (31)
In Eqs. (30) and (31) we have defined:
|φ1Y 〉BE = −i|0Y 〉B |−〉E + |1Y 〉B |+〉E√
2
, (32)
|φ0Y 〉BE = |0Y 〉B |+〉E + i|1Y 〉B |−〉E√
2
, (33)
|±〉 =
|√µout〉 ± | − √µout〉√
2
. (34)
Notice that when µout → 0, |ψ0X〉BE → |0X〉B |v〉E ,
|ψ1X〉BE → |1X〉B |v〉E , |φ1Y 〉BE → |1Y 〉B |v〉E and
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|φ0Y 〉BE → |0Y 〉B |v〉E , where |v〉 is the vacuum state,
thus recovering from Eqs. (30) and (31) two maximally
entangled states in a two-dimensional Hilbert space ten-
sor product with the vacuum state. This situation is
secure against the THA and constitutes a reference for
our later argument in Appendix C.2. However, when
µout > 0, the effective Hilbert space’s dimension be-
comes larger than two, favoring the THA. Note also that
the states in Eq. (34) are orthogonal but not normal-
ized, while the states in Eqs. (32) and (33) are nor-
malized. More specifically: 〈±|±〉 = 1 ± exp(−2µout),
〈±|∓〉 = 0, 〈φwY |φwY 〉 = 1, with w = {0, 1}.
Let us assume for the moment that the system E is
not accessible either to Alice or to Eve. Under this as-
sumption, the proof method in Ref. [68] applies. This
is so for a twofold reason. First, the security argument
in [68] is based on the description given in [30, 31], which
allows for an enlarged dimension of Alice’s Hilbert space.
Second, Eve cannot perform a basis-dependent selection
of the states emitted by Alice, because the basis informa-
tion is contained in the system E, which is not accessible
to her. Therefore, as shown in [68], she cannot modify
the transmission rates of Alice’s states using the basis
information potentially leaked from Alice’s module. We
notice that also in the specific THA considered here Eve
has no chance to modify the transmission rates during
the quantum transmission, due to the fact that Eve is
allowed to access the system E only after the basis in-
formation has been publicly disclosed by the users.
Given that, suppose that Alice measures the ancil-
lary states of |Ψ〉 in the Y basis. Because the states in
Eqs. (32) and (33) are normalized, she will obtain with
probability 1/2 the state |0Y 〉 and with probability 1/2
the state |1Y 〉, thus projecting |Ψ〉 into one of the follow-
ing two states, respectively:
ρ
(0)
B = TrE(|φ1Y 〉BE〈φ1Y |)
= c−|0Y 〉B〈0Y |+ c+|1Y 〉B〈1Y |
=
1
2
[σˆ0 − exp(−2µout)σˆ2], (35)
ρ
(1)
B = TrE(|φ0Y 〉BE〈φ0Y |)
= c+|0Y 〉B〈0Y |+ c−|1Y 〉B〈1Y |
=
1
2
[σˆ0 + exp(−2µout)σˆ2], (36)
where we have defined c± := 〈±|±〉/2 and introduced
the identity operator in the 2-dimensional Hilbert space
σˆ0 and the Pauli matrix σˆ2 = [(0,−i), (i, 0)]. These op-
erators are necessary to connect the Y -basis states of
the virtual protocol, Eq. (32) and (33), to the Y -basis
states of the real protocol, contained in the third and
fourth line of Eq. (17). Because any qubit state can
be written as a linear combination of identity and Pauli
matrices, its transmission rate can be obtained directly
from the Pauli matrices’ transmission rates [68]. Accord-
ingly, we define the transmission rate of σˆk, k = {0, 2}, as
qsY |k = Tr(DˆsY σˆk)/2, with DˆsY =
∑
l Aˆ
†
l MˆsY Aˆl, Aˆl an
arbitrary operator associated to Eve’s action and MˆsY
the operator representing Bob’s POVM in the Y basis
associated to the bit value s. We can then obtain the
transmission rates in the virtual and real protocol as com-
binations of the qsY |k’s.
Let us call py the probability that Alice and Bob both
select the Y basis. In the real protocol (superscript r),
the joint probability PjY ,iY that Alice sends out the state
|iY 〉 and Bob detects |jY 〉 (i, j = 0, 1) is for each pair of
states:
P(r)0Y ,1Y =
p2y
2
(q0Y |0 + q0Y |2),
P(r)1Y ,1Y =
p2y
2
(q1Y |0 + q1Y |2),
P(r)0Y ,0Y =
p2y
2
(q0Y |0 − q0Y |2),
P(r)1Y ,0Y =
p2y
2
(q1Y |0 − q1Y |2). (37)
The corresponding probabilities in the virtual protocol
(superscript v) are:
P(v)0Y ,1Y =
p2y
2
(q0Y |0 + e
−2µoutq0Y |2),
P(v)1Y ,1Y =
p2y
2
(q1Y |0 + e
−2µoutq1Y |2),
P(v)0Y ,0Y =
p2y
2
(q0Y |0 − e−2µoutq0Y |2),
P(v)1Y ,0Y =
p2y
2
(q1Y |0 − e−2µoutq1Y |2). (38)
In order to define the phase error rate, we need to identify
the error event in the virtual protocol. This can be done
using Eqs. (17), (31), (32) in the limit µout → 0. When
there is no THA on the channel, Bob obtains the correct
state |1Y 〉 (|0Y 〉) when Alice measures |0Y 〉 (|1Y 〉) on her
ancillary states. Hence we associate an error with both
Alice and Bob obtaining the same state, |0Y 〉 or |1Y 〉. So
the phase error rate can be written as:
e′Y =
P(v)0Y ,0Y + P
(v)
1Y ,1Y
P(v)0Y ,0Y + P
(v)
0Y ,1Y
+ P(v)1Y ,0Y + P
(v)
1Y ,1Y
. (39)
From Eqs. (37), (38) we can rewrite the phase error rate
in terms of the rates measured in the real protocol. The
result is:
e′Y =
1
2
[1− a(r)P exp(−2µout)], (40)
where we have set:
a
(r)
P =
∑
i,j={0,1}(−)i+j+1P(r)jY ,iY∑
i,j={0,1} P(r)jY ,iY
. (41)
The secure key rate is obtained by replacing the phase
error of Eq. (40) into Eq. (21):
R∗ = QX [1− h (e′Y )− fECh (eX)] . (42)
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FIG. 8. Asymptotic key rate R∗ versus distance for the single-
photon efficient BB84 protocol, under a passive THA. The
rate is plotted for various values of the parameter µout. Pa-
rameters in the simulation are as in Fig. 3.
The key rate in Eq. (42) applies to slightly more gen-
eral THA than the specific one considered in this sec-
tion. It applies to all THA in which Eve cannot interact
with the auxiliary Trojan-horse states (labelled with E in
Eq. (17) ) during the transmission of the qubit states (la-
belled with B in Eq. (17) ). We already noted that if Eve
cannot access the auxiliary system E during the quantum
transmission, she cannot selectively modify the transmis-
sion rates P. Here we additionally note that even if Eve
changed her action, described by the operators Aˆl, ac-
cording to whether she will own or not the auxiliary sys-
tem E after the basis reconciliation step, she would not
gain more information about the final key. This descends
from Koashi’s proof method [30], upon which the proof
described in [68] is built. There, it was shown that irre-
spective of who owns the auxiliary system, whether Alice
or Eve, if the users can obtain a faithful estimation of the
phase error rate e′Y , they can in principle distil a perfect
qubit in a Y eigenstate. When measured by Alice in the
data basis X, the Y eigenstate always provides her with
a fully random key bit, not predictable by Eve. There-
fore, even if Eve tunes her choice of the operators Aˆl on
the auxiliary system E, her knowledge of the final key
does not increase. The only condition required is that
Eve accesses the auxiliary system E after the quantum
transmission has been completed by the users.
To adapt the key rate in Eq. (42) to the decoy-state
estimation technique we exploit Assumption 3 in Ap-
pendix A, according to which Eve cannot use the THA
to modify the decoy-state estimation. Then we need to
show which quantities have to be estimated using decoy
states. We use the tilde to explicitly indicate such quan-
tities in the key rate:
R˜∗ = Q˜(1)X
{
1− h
[
e˜
′(1)
Y
]}
−Q(s)X fECh[e(s)X ], (43)
where s is the mean photon number of the signal in the
decoy-state set, Q˜
(1)
X is the overall single-photon detec-
FIG. 9. Asymptotic key rate R˜∗ versus distance for the decoy-
state efficient BB84 protocol, under a passive THA. The rate
is plotted for various values of the parameter µout. Parameters
in the simulation are as in Fig. 4.
tion rate in the X-basis, estimated using the decoy-state
technique, Q
(s)
X and e
(s)
X are, respectively, the measured
detection and error rates for the signal in the X basis.
Furthermore, we have set:
e˜
′(1)
Y =
1
2
[1− a(r)P˜ exp(−2µout)] ,
a
(r)
P˜ =
∑
i,j={0,1}(−)i+j+1P˜(r)jY ,iY∑
i,j={0,1} P˜(r)jY ,iY
, (44)
which are a straightforward generalization of Eqs. (40)
and (41).
The key rates R∗ and R˜∗ are plotted in Figs. 8 and 9.
Both the resulting key rates show no strong dependence
on the mean Trojan photon number µout. The key rates
are coincident with the ideal rate corresponding to no
THA for all values of µout smaller than ∼ 10−2, and re-
mains positive up to values 0.5 (0.38) in case of a single-
photon (decoy-state) source. This represents an improve-
ment of several orders of magnitude over the key rates
for a general THA presented in Sec. II and suggests that
the power of a THA comes from Eve’s capability of se-
lectively introducing losses in the transmission channel,
conditional on the information gained from the THA.
This observation motivates the study of a more involved
THA, in which the shield system E is actively used.
2. Trojan-horse attack with active unambiguous state
discrimination of the Trojan photons
We consider a particular THA in which Eve can access
the ancillary system E, generated by the THA, during
the quantum transmission, i.e., before the bases are re-
vealed by the users. However, she can only measure it
using a specific measurement described later on. This is
more powerful than the THA considered in the previous
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section, but less powerful than the most general THA
discussed in Sec. II and Appendix B.
In this THA, Eve accesses the space E of the Tro-
jan photons during the quantum transmission stage. She
then uses Unambiguous State Discrimination (USD) [73]
to distinguish |+√µout〉E from |−√µout〉E . These states
correspond to Alice’s states in the data basis (X), as per
Eq. (17). Therefore, whenever the USD succeeds, Eve
knows the key bit without measuring, and hence per-
turbing, Alice’s qubit.
However the USD measurement not always provides
Eve with a conclusive result and Eve’s strategy can be
improved as follows. When the result is conclusive,
Eve transmits Alice’s pulse to Bob without modification;
when it is inconclusive, Eve stops Alice’s pulse and in-
troduces a loss in the communication channel. Later on,
during the basis reconciliation step, Eve will learn the
bases chosen by Alice and Bob. After discarding the out-
comes of the USD performed on Alice’s Y -basis states,
Eve will be left, ideally, with the same key bits as the
users, distilled from the X basis, without having caused
any noise on the communication channel.
Let us add more details to this scenario. When Alice
prepares a Y -basis state, Eve’s retrieved Trojan pulse is
in a state | ± i√µout〉E . This state cannot help Eve de-
ciding between the two outcomes related to the X basis,
because it is equally likely to be projected on either of the
two X basis states |±√µout〉E . Therefore, Eve’s decision
to retain or transmit Alice’s state is not related to an in-
creased information gained by Eve and does not require
an increase of the privacy amplification performed by the
users. On the contrary, when Alice prepares a X-basis
state, Eve can modify the transmission rates in a way
that affects the security of the system. In a worst-case
scenario, we then assume that all the counts detected by
Bob come from the X basis and from a conclusive out-
come of Eve’s USD measurement.
Let us call pcon and pinc = 1 − pcon the probabilities
of a conclusive and inconclusive outcome, respectively,
from the USD of X-basis states. A lower bound to pinc
is given by the Ivanovic-Dieks-Peres bound [73–75]:
pinc ≥ |〈√µout| − √µout〉|
= exp(−2µout). (45)
Then, according to the above-described THA, the frac-
tion of detected events in the X basis that have been
transmitted conditional on a conclusive result by Eve is
at most:
δ ≤ 1− pincYX ≤
1− exp(−2µout)
Y , (46)
with Y := min[YX ,YY ] and YX (YY ) the single-photon
yield in the X (Y ) basis. The fraction δ (respectively
1−δ) contains insecure (secure) bits distilled by the users,
because they come from Eve’s conclusive (inconclusive)
measurement. When the USD is inconclusive, Eve can-
not modify selectively Alice’s pulses using the system E.
FIG. 10. Asymptotic key rate R∗∗ versus distance for the
single-photon efficient BB84 protocol, under a THA with un-
ambiguous state discrimination by Eve. The rate is plotted
for various values of the parameter µout. Parameters in the
simulation are as in Fig. 3.
FIG. 11. Asymptotic key rate R˜∗∗ versus distance for the
decoy-state efficient BB84 protocol, under a THA with un-
ambiguous state discrimination by Eve. The rate is plotted
for various values of the parameter µout. Parameters in the
simulation are as in Fig. 4.
Therefore, following the same reasoning as in the previ-
ous section, we can apply the proof of Ref. [68] to this
fraction of pulses to estimate the key rate.
In the present THA, whenever the USD provides a con-
clusive outcome, Eve forwards Alice’s pulse to Bob with-
out perturbing it. Therefore only a fraction 1− δ of the
counts provide a faithful estimation of the error rate. Af-
ter bounding the phase error rate as e′Y /(1− δ), we can
follow similar steps as in Ref. [29] to show that secure
key bits can be extracted from the single-photon efficient
BB84 protocol in presence of the here-described THA at
a rate:
R∗∗ = QX
{
(1− δ)
[
1− h
(
e′Y
1− δ
)]
− fECh (eX)
}
.
(47)
Eqs. (46) and (47) can be easily generalized to the case of
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a decoy-state source under Assumption 3 of Appendix A:
R˜∗∗ = Q˜(1)X (1− δ˜(1))
[
1− h
(
e˜
′(1)
Y
1− δ˜(1)
)]
−Q(s)X fECh[e(s)X ],
δ˜(1) =
1− exp(−2µout)
Y˜(1) , (48)
with Y˜(1) = min[Y˜(1)X , Y˜(1)Y ]. In Eq. (48), the tilde indi-
cates quantities to be estimated via the decoy state tech-
nique. Q
(s)
X and e
(s)
X are the same as in Eq. (43). The
expression of the phase error rate e˜
′(1)
Y is the same as in
Eq. (44), because it is estimated in the Y basis which, in
this specific THA, does not allow Eve to selectively mod-
ify the transmission rate conditional on her information
on Alice’s state.
The key rates in Eqs. (47) and (48) are plotted in
Figs. 10 and 11, respectively. Despite they are better
than the key rates in Figs. 3 and 4, drawn for the most
general THA from the GLLP proof method [29], there
is no wide gap between the two situations. This sug-
gests that the particular THA described here catches the
main features of the general attack described in Sec. II.
It also suggests that the real-time use of the auxiliary
system E is the main source of troubles in a THA. This
seems to be particularly detrimental in the framework of
Ref. [68], which heavily relies on Eve’s inability to change
the transmission rates of the states emitted by Alice.
It would be interesting to extend the proof method of
Ref. [68] to more general Trojan-horse attacks than the
one described in this section. However, such a general-
ization is not straightforward and a separate analysis is
required [76].
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